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The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1972-1973 Term
A Symposium
I Editor's Note. The articles in this symposium discuss selected decisions of Louisiana
appellate courts reported in the advance sheets dated July 1, 1972 to July 1, 1973.]
PRIVATE LAW
LAW IN GENERAL
Robert A. Pascal*
DISSENTS FROM GRANTING OF WRITS
Dissents to the granting of writs were entered in four instances.
In one,' the dissent was to the granting of a writ of prohibition against
a lower court order recusing a district attorney in a grand jury pro-
ceeding, and thus a dissent to the determination of the issue pre-
sented in the application for the writ without the benefit of a hearing.
Such a dissent to a granting of a writ was unobjectionable, it being
in favor of the petitioner. Also understandable was the dissent from
the granting of a writ on the basis that the application therefor does
not conform to the rules on the subject.2
The other instances of dissents to the granting of writs, however,
were in effect formally rendered personal opinions on the merits of the
petitioners' claims for review. Thus in Board of Supervisors of L. S. U.
v. Lewark,I two justices declared simply "there is no basis for grant-
ing this writ," and in Society to Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis,4
three justices delivered separate opinions dissenting on the basis of
their appreciation of the substantive merit of the application. This
practice cannot but create in the mind of the person granted the writ
the impression that the dissenting justice has already judged the case
definitively and will not have an open mind when the court acts to
reach its decision on the merits. It is true, of course, that the refusal
of a writ also often represents a decision on the merits, but the refusal
of a writ of review does not result in argument before the court and
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State ex rel. Marvin v. McClendon, 262 La. 447, 263 So. 2d 720 (1972).
2. Society to Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis, 262 La. 1076, 266 So. 2d 215
(1972).
3. 277 So. 2d 441 (La. 1973).
4. 262 La. 1077, 266 So. 2d 216 (1972).
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further deliberation by the court itself. The granting of a writ of
review entails that argument and further deliberation and the litigant
should not be exposed to the fear that one or more of the justices may
not be in a mood to hear him with an open mind.
PREVIOUS DECISIONS AND CUSTOM
In the 1970 case of Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. ,5
the Louisiana supreme court affirmed vigorously the Louisiana judi-
cial practice of applying the law of the place of a civil offense to
determine the substantive rights and obligations between the of-
fender and the offended. In the majority opinion Justice Summers
had written as follows:
What is unique here is that this departure from the settled
jurisprudence should be undertaken by an intermediate court.
The action involves, at least, a failure by the Second Circuit to
recognize its obligation to follow the settled law of this State. For,
since the question is not regulated by statute, the law is what this
court has announced it to be."
Associate Professor Tate of the Louisiana State University School of
Law and the present writer disputed the accuracy of the above state-
ment in the Louisiana Law Review's Symposium on the 1969-1970
Louisiana appellate decisions,7 arguing that previous judicial deci-
sions of themselves neither constitute "law" or "custom," nor obli-
gate lower courts until reversed.
In the past term the supreme court overruled Johnson.' Justice
Summers dissented, arguing that the supreme court had applied the
lex loci delicti in similar cases for at least seventy-three years, that
this practice constituted a jurisprudence constante, and that the de-
parture from a jurisprudence constante "lies more properly within the
province of the legislature." ' In support of his position Justice Sum-
mers proceeds to say that the doctrine of jurisprudence constante has
been "explained with clarity" by the present writer and proceeds to
quote the following passage from what Professor Tote and the writer
had stated in the Louisiana Law Review's Symposium on the 1969-
1970 Louisiana appellate decisions:
5. 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970).
6. Id. at 294, 236 So. 2d at 217-18 (Emphasis added.)
7. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Law in
General, 31 LA. L. REv. 185-88 (1971).
8. Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973). The case is discussed in
the Conflict of Laws portion of this Symposium, page 319 infra.
9. 276 So. 2d 309, 315.
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It is, nevertheless, entirely consistent with the Digest of 1808, and
with the general Spanish law of which it was a digest, to affirm
that "a long series" of judicial decisions, "constantly repeated"
and enjoying "uninterrupted acquiescence" by the people, may
evidence that "tacit and common consent" of the people which
is as generative of custom as the express consent of the whole
people through their representatives is generative of legislation
Certainly there is a misunderstanding here. Professor TMte and the
writer were stating that a custom could arise by reason of a popular
uninterrupted acquiescence in a judicial practice, but had not stated
that even a jurisprudence constante would of itself constitute either
custom or accepted usage. Custom and accepted usage require
popular approbation, not merely judicial acceptance. Thus, for exam-
ple, the long line of Louisiana supreme court decisions misconstruing
articles 184-197 of the Civil Code, on the disavowal of paternity and
the proof of legitimate parentage, cannot be considered either custom
or accepted usage because these decisions have been and are being
attacked incessantly. The judiciary, indeed, may act authoritatively
only for the particular persons and situation momentarily before it."
Justice Summers' statement nevertheless deserves more atten-
tion if it is to be read as meaning that a (popular) custom is to be
followed by the judiciary on the authority of article 3 of the Civil
Code,' 2 and that a (popularly) received usage is to be honored in the
absence of legislation or custom on the authority of article 21 of the
Civil Code." Even then, however, the custom or the received usage
would have to be reasonable, for reasonableness has always been
understood to be an essential element of the initial and continued
validity of custom. This is true even in Anglo-American law. Black-
stone, for example, states:
When a custom is actually proved to exist . . . if it is not good
custom it ought to be no longer used. To make a particular cus-
10. Id. The passage quoted is from The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1969-1970 Term-Law in General, 31 LA. L. REv. 185, 186-87 (1971).
11. For a fuller discussion see the comments of Professor Tote and the writer cited
in note 7 supra.
12. L . CiV. CODE art. 3: "Customs result from a long series of actions constantly
repeated, which have by such repetition, and by uninterrupted acquiescence, acquired
the force of a tacit and common consent."
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 21: "In all Civil matters, where there is no express law, the
judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an
appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law
is silent."
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tom good, the following are necessary requisites .... 4. Customs
must be reasonable; or rather, taken negatively, they must not
be unreasonable .... 14
Thus in any case of a (popular, not merely judicial) custom or re-
ceived usage it is always permissible to inquire into its reasonableness
and to reject it if it does not meet the proper standard. Indeed, sub-
stantive due process would require this, and the fact that men once
failed to detect the unreasonableness of a custom or of a received
usage would be no argument against its rejection.2
14. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *76, 77.
15. The above has been written without comment on the position, shared by the
majority in Jagers as well as by Justice Summers, that conflicts law is a part of state
law. For the contention that conflicts law is federal law and not state law, however,
see the discussion of Jagers in the Conflict of Laws portion of this Symposium.
